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NATIJRE OF THE CASE 
The actions involved in the two lawsuits joined for trial 
in the District Court arose out of a real estate contract for 
50 acres of land entered into between Corporation Nine, ap-
pellant, as buyer, and Ray L. Taylor and Neva W. Taylor, 
his wife, respondents, as sellers. The Taylors gave notice of 
termination of the contract claiming default in payment. Cor-
poration Nine filed suit against Taylors for specific perform-
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ance and damages, and Taylors filed suit against Corporation 
Nine and John New to have the title to the property quieted 
in Taylors and for interest, costs and attorney's fees. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court entered judgment for Taylors dismissing 
Corporation Nine's complaint, dismissed John New from the 
Taylors' action against him, and granted judgment to Taylors 
against Corporation Nine quieting title in them and awarded 
interest, costs and attorney's fees to Taylors. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Taylors, respondents, seek an affirmance of the trial 
court's judgment except as to the amount awarded for attor-
ney's fees and ask for an order from the Supreme Court re-
manding the case back to the trial court to take evidence on 
the amount of attorney fees. Respondents also ask for attorneys 
fees in connection with the appeal. Corporation Nine, appellant, 
seeks a reversal of the trial court's decision, for an order re-
quiring specific performance or in the alternative for dam-
ages, costs and attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Both of the lawsuits involved in this appeal arose out of 
a contract for purchase of land dated the 24th day of January, 
1968, in which Ray 1. Taylor and Neva W. Taylor, his wife, 
as sellers, agreed to sell to Corporation Nine, as buyer, 50 
acres of land described as: 
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The South 120 rds of the W. Y:z of the N.W. Y4, and 
Lot 1, Sec. 36, Twp. 2 S., Range 1 East, S. L.B. & M., 
and commencing at S.W. Y4 of Sec. 36, E. 792', N. 
10 rds, E. 528', N. 70 rds; West 80 rds, S. 80 rds to 
point of beginning, containing 124.58 acres in total, 
less the S.W. 30.0 acres and the N. 44.58 acres, mak-
ing a total net acreage involved in this agreement of 
50.0 acres and further described as being a 50.0 acre 
tract adjoining Esquire Estates No. 1 Subdivision on the 
South and extending North to form a straight line E. 
and W. and leaving a remainder of 44.58 acres in the 
present Taylor property which before this agreement 
contained 94.58 acres. (See Exhibit 2, Plat of 50 
acres) 
The contract which was prepared by the attorney for 
Corporation Nine ( R. 104) provided for a purchase price of 
$240,000.00 with $20,000.00 to be paid down at time of 
the execution of the contract and $25,000.00 annually there-
after (Exhibit 1). The $25,000.00 annual payment was in-
sisted upon by Mr. Taylor so that he could have an annual in-
come from said contract in that amount ( R. 250). The con-
tract called for the accrual of interest on the balance at the 
rate of 4 Sr per annum commencing March 1, 1969 (Exhibit 
1 ) . 
The contract further provided that upon the payment of 
the down payment of $20,000.00 the seller was to convey by 
warranty deed to the buyer fee title to six acres of land in 
accordance with the plat (Exhibit 2). On the 1st of March, 
1969, the buyer was to receive an additional five acres contigu-
ous to the initial six acres and appropriate to development of 
the entire parcel by warranty deed in exchange for $25,000.00 
and on each succeeding March I st thereafter in like manner 
until the full ~240,000.00 was paid including interest with 
each annual payment. 
Possession of the land was to be delivered to the buyer 
as each parcel was paid for and the seller was to continue to pay 
the taxes and retain possession of all unconveyed land. 
The contract further provided that the buyer had no 
privilege of pre-payment other than consistent with the terms 
of the agreement, unless prior written consent was obtained 
from the sellers. 
The contract also provided that in the event of failure to 
comply with the terms by the buyer or upon failure of the 
buyer to make any payment or payments when the same be-
came due, or within 30 days thereafter, after written notice the 
seller had the right upon failure of the buyer to remedy the 
default within five ( 5) days of the receipt of the written notice 
to be released from the contract and that time was of the es-
sence of the contract (Exhibit 1). 
The contract provided for payment of reasonable attor-
ney's fees by the defaulting party (Exhibit 1). 
The land involved in the agreement is located east of 
Wasatch Boulevard at approximately 7800 South (See Ex-
hibit 2). Within a few days after the execution of the con-
tract Taylor executed a deed for 6.567 acres and received in 
exchange $20,000.00 cash and a promissory note for 
$12,835.00. Taylor testified that when the original discussion 
took place with respect to the sale of the land they discussed 
only the sum of $5,000.00 per acre (R. 249, 262) with a 
down payment of $30,000.00 for six acres (R. 245). Taylor 
was living in California at the time of the execution of the 
contract (R. 246). New went to Taylor's home in California 
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to have him sign the contract and at that time New told Taylor 
he was unable to get the full amount of the $30,000.00, but 
Valley State Bank would loan him $20,000.00 and that New 
would give him a note for $10,000.00 and a second mortgage 
on the land that Taylor had conveyed to him (R. 246, 247). 
New asked Taylor not to record the mortgage so the bank 
would not know (R. 248). Taylor objected to taking a note, 
but New said he would pay it off in a few months. After 
returning to Salt Lake New called Taylor on the phone and 
claimed he needed an additional .567 acres to round out the 
lots so there would not be parts of lots left over ( R. 262) (See 
also Exhibit 2-Plat) New said he would make the note for 
$12,835.00 (R. 263). The note, (Exhibit D-33), mortgage 
(Exhibit P. 3 5), and $20,000.00 were sent to Taylor by Se-
curity Title. The note had been made payable in three years 
instead of six months ( R. 248). The contract provided for 
payment of $240,000.00 for the 50 acres and this was the first 
occasion Taylor knew of the $240,000.00 purchase price m 
the contract (R. 247-8). 
The note was finally paid in June of 1971 after a lawsuit 
was filed on the note and to foreclose the mortgage (R. 250). 
The note did not provide for interest (Exhibit D-33) but when 
Taylor talked to New about not paying it in six months, New 
said he would pay interest on the note ( R. 282). 
New admitted that he and Taylor had agreed upon a 
payment of $30,000.00 for the initial six acres but claimed that 
it was on a release of $5,000.00 per acre (R. 118). When his 
deposition was taken, he admitted that the whole contract was 
$250,000.00 for the 50 acres (R. 118-119). He denied at 
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the trial that it \vas for $250,000.00 (R. 118, 623, 624) but 
admitted to the following questions and answers given at the 
deposition: 
R. 118, L. 26 
Q. Now when I questioned you at the time your 
deposition was taken you told me that it was 
($250,000.00 for 50 acres) didn't you? 
119, L. 6 
A. Yes. 
17 
Q. And you said it was $250,000.00 for 50 acres, 
didn't you? 
L. 9 
A. I said yes, I said yes. 
R. 119, L. 23 
Q. Now you told me initially also that the agreed 
price per acre for the 50 acres was $5,000.00 an 
acre did you not, at the time I took your depo-
sition. 
L. 27 
A. If I did, it was meant as a release fee. 
Q. Just tell me whether or not you did. 
A. Then I say negative. 
L. 30 
Q. Now would you please refer to your deposition 
at Page 16, L. 10: Q. What was the agreed 
price per acre of land that you were buying under 
the contract? 
R. 120, L. 3 
A. $5,000.00 per acre. 
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L.9 
Q. An_d then I asked you, did I not, whether you had 
paid for any acreage that you had not received, 




Q. And then on page 17, is it not true at line 9 that 
I asked you - line 7: "Now then, the contract 
states, I believe, $240,000.00 but actually the 
price was not that, was it?" 
R. 121, L. 
And your answer on line 9: "Well, it was $250,000.00 
and then this promissory note made up the difference 
between the 240 and the 250." 
In each instance the witness changed the above answers 
before filing his deposition with the court but after transcrip-
tion ( R. 119-121 ) . 
Early in 1969 New approached Taylor and told him that 
he was trying to get the Home Show on the land and that the 
Home Show was interested in having the show on the land. 
Taylor told New he would be interested in hearing what the 
financing was, and Mr. \Vells of Valley State Bank called 
Taylor on the phone and talked to him about the transaction 
(R. 252, 111). New contacted Taylor and told him he need-
ed additional acreage to put on the Home Show. Taylor agreed 
to sell him some additional land (R. 112). In February, 1969, 
Taylor sold to New three separate parcels of land to be used 
in connection with the Home Show. One tract was 8.618 
acres, one 4.45 acres and one 1.18 acres. The 1.18 acres was 
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outside the 50 acre tract (Exhibit P-2, R. 292, 256). The 
court found as a fact that the sale of the 1.18 acres for the 
sum of $5,900.00 was not part of the 50 acre tract contem-
plated in the contract and payment therefor was not a payment 
on the acreage covered by the contract ( R. 48). 
The 1.18 acres were sold by Taylor to New at the rate 
of $5,000.00 per acre which Taylor contended was the acre 
price for all the land sold ( R. 262). The 8.618 acres and the 
4.45 acres called for payment at the rate of $5,000.00 per 
acre and the payments were applied and paid as follows: 
8.618 acres at $5,000.00 per acre -





$25,000.00 was applied to the March 1, 1969 payment. 
This was paid on February 17, 1969 (R. 123, 124). The bal-
ance of the $43,090.00, to wit: $18,090.00 was paid by Val-
ley State Bank to Taylor on January 7, 1970. This payment 
was guaranteed by Valley State Bank if Taylor released the 
land so they could have the Home Show (R. 253). Valley 
State Bank and Security Title were acting as escrow agents 
(R. 253). 
In connection with the sale of the 4.45 acres for 
$22,250.00 a written "Letter of Instruction" to Security Title 
Company (Exhibit P-5) dated 2-6-69 was signed by both New 
on behalf of Corporation Nine and Taylor pertaining only to 
the 4.45 acres. In addition to other provisions the "Letter of 
Instructions" provides that for the benefit of Corporation Nine 
any funds received by Security Title under the terms of this 
"Letter of Instructions" shall apply to the annual payment re-
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quired under the contract of purchase (Exhibit 5, Page 1, 
Paragraph 3). This was the only authorization for pre-pay-
ment between the parties ( R. 27 2) and covered the payment 
for March 1, 1970, except for the sum of $2,750.00. The pay-
ment of the $22,250.00 was made to Taylor by Security Title 
on October 9, 1969, and applied to the payment due March 1, 
1970 (R. 255). Taylor didn't bill New for the $2,750.00 
balance for that year ( R. 2 5 5 ) . He did send him a statement 
fer the interest to become due on March 1, 1970 in the sum 
of $6,597.12 which was dated February 10, 1970 (Exhibit 
P-6). The payment was not made on the due date and New 
wrote Taylor on March 14, 1970, requesting an extension 
until June 30, 1970, and agreeing to pay 10% on the interest 
due from March 1, 1970, until June 30, 1970 (Exhibit P-7). 
On June 20, 1970 Taylor sent a notice of interest pay-
rr.ent due June 30, 1970 for the sum of $6,817.02 (Exhibit 
P-8). On July 29, 1970 New sent a letter to Taylor advising 
him he would send payment by August 5, 1970 (Exhibit P-9). 
On November 19, 1970 New sent a letter and check to Taylor 
for the sum of $7,025.98 bringing the interest payment current 
(Exhibit P-10). 
On February 25, 1971 Taylor sent notice to New ad-
vising him of the interest and principal payment due on March 
1, 1971 which was $25,000.00 for the principal payment and 
$5,837.00 in interest, for a total of $30,837.00 (Exhibit P-13). 
New failed to make payment and on the 4th day of April 
New was served with a notice by the constable that if the de-
fault was nor corrected within five days, the contract was termi-
nated (Exhibit P-14). New tendered a payment of $9,197.00 
covering interest of $5,437.00 and principal of $3,760.00 
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(Exhibit P-15 ) which Taylor refused and returned (Exhibit 
P-17, R. 136, 137). No tender was ever made of the 
$25,000.00 installment due on the 1st of March, 1971 (R. 
133). 
The trial court found that the contract purchase price was 
$240,000.00, that the sale of 1.18 acres was not part of the 50 
acres and payment not to be credited toward the 50 acres; that 
the principal balance due on March 1, 1971 was $141,825.00 
and that the interest due for the period of March 1, 1970 to 
March 1, 1971 at 4% was $5,673.00; that Corporation Nine 
was in default for failure to make tender of the payment, or 
payment of the same, in the sum of $25,000.00 due on March 
1, 1971; that the notice given by Taylor to New of default 
was proper in all respects and as required by law and gave judg-
ment to Taylor for interest in the sum of $6,099.87 to time 
of judgment, an attorney's fee in the amount of $1,000.00, 
quieted title in the property to Taylors and dismissed Corpo-
ration Nine's action against Taylor (R. 47). The court by 
stipulation of counsel agreed to hear evidence pertaining to the 
reasonableness of the attorney's fee which was to be done after 
the court made its ruling but awarded Taylor $1,000.00 in 
attorney's fees in its memorandum decision without hearing 




THE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT ESTOPPED 
BY ANY CONDUCT ON THEIR PART TO RE-
FUSE ACCEPTANCE OF PLAINTIFF'S IMPROP-
ER TENDER OF PAYMENT. 
The trial court found that appellant, Corporation Nine, 
was in default in failing to tender or make the scheduled 1971 
payment of $25,000.00 and that the Taylors were not in de-
fault in any way on the contract and gave judgment quieting 
title to the property in Taylors ( R. 49). 
The review by the Supreme Court is in light most favor-
able to the findings of the trial court. Coombs v. Ouzanian, 
24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356. 
It is obvious from reading the provisions of the contract 
that Taylor's intention in entering into the terms thereof was to 
provide himself with an annual income of $25,000.00 per 
year and that that sum was to be paid each year in exchange for 
five acres of land unless written permission or consent was ob-
tained from the sellers granting the buyer the privilege of pre-
payment (Exhibit I). Taylor testified that he had insisted 
that an annual payment of $25,000.00 be made so that he 
could depend on it as an income ( R. 2 5 0). 
The contract was actually prepared by the attorney for 
Corporation Nine (R. 104) and in construing the contract it 
must be construed most strongly against the party preparing it. 
There was, in fact, only two sales of property between the 
parties. The original sale was of 6.567 acres when the con-
tract was initiated in January of 1968 and again in February 
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of 1969 when the buyer wanted some extra land so that the 
Home Show could be sponsored. In the first instance .567 
acres were requested by the buyer and Taylors agreed at the 
buyer's request to allow the Corporation to have .567 acres of 
land to round out some lots that would otherwise only be parti-
ally included in the initial 6 acres (See Exhibit 2). This addi-
tional land was paid for by a promissory note in the sum of 
$12,835.00. 
In the second instance Corporation Nine obtained, at its 
request, two tracts of land within the 50 acre tract, one of 
8 .618 acres and one of 4 .4 5 acres and also purchased 1. 18 
acres outside of the 50 acre tract. The 8.618 acres was paid 
for at $5,000.00 per acre, with $25,000.00 being credited to 
the 1969 installment due on March 1, 1969 and the balance 
of the payment for that acreage, $18,090.00, was paid by 
Valley State Bank to Taylor on January 7, 1970. This pay-
ment was guaranteed to Taylors by Valley State Bank if Taylor 
released the land so Corporation Nine, which was being fi-
nanced by Valley State Bank, could have the Home Show. 
Valley State Bank along with Security Title were acting as 
escrow agents ( R. 25 3). Permission was not given Corpo-
ration Nine to credit the $18,090.00 as a pre-payment, but 
it is significant that Taylors did agree to allow Corporation 
Nine to use payment of the $22,250.00 for the 4.45 acres as 
a pre-payment for the 1970 payment and pursuant to the pro-
visions of the contract of January 24, 1968, a "Letter of Instruc-
tions" was signed by Taylor and also by New on behalf of 
Corporation Nine authorizing the payment of the $22,250.00 
to be credited to the March 1, 1970 payment (Exhibit 5, Page 
1, Paragraph 3). Actually this payment was made through 
Security Title to Taylors in October, 1969. 
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Counsel for Corporation Nine contends that the sale of 
rhe acreage in 1969 was an amendment to the contract, but 
the very fact that there was a provision in the contract pertain-
ing to a requirement that pre-payment could not be made with-
out permission in writing naturally infers that the parries antic-
ipate<l there would or could be some transfers of property 
over and above the five acres provided for annually but that 
the annual payment would still have to be made unless written 
permission was otherwise granted. This is, in fact, what hap-
pened on this occasion and the "Letter of Instructions" is in 
accordance with the provision of the contract and the intent 
of the parties under the contract. 
There was no basis whatever for Corporation Nine to make 
claim that it did not owe a payment of $25,000.00 on March 
1, 1971. Plaintiff produced no evidence to show a waiver of 
that payment. 
Appellant has cited many rules pertammg to equitable 
estoppel, that a written contract may be changed, modified or 
waived in whole er in part by a subsequent one, express, writ-
ten, oral or implied, promissory estoppel, and estoppel in pais, 
and resondent acknowledges these general rules, but they do 
not fit the facts of the case before this court. There is also 
a well known rule of law that he who would have equity must 
do equity. 
The contract between these parties provided that upon 
payment of $5,000.00 per acre a deed would be executed by 
Taylors to Corporation Nine of that particular acreage paid for 
and possession of the land would be delivered to the buyer 
of the actual acreage paid for with the seller to retain posses-
sion of and pay the taxes on the unconveyed land. The con-
tract was more on the order of a divisible contract. As is stated 
in 17 Am. Jur. 2d at page 760: 
If it appears that the purpose is to take the whole or 
none, the contract is entire; otherwise, it is severable. 
Another test is the possibility or impossibility of a cer-
tain apportionment of benefits, according to the com-
pensation in the contract, in case of part performance 
only. If the consideration is expressly or by necessary 
implication apportioned the contract is severable. 
Until the buyer paid the sum of $25,000.00 the seller 
had no obligation to convey any land and had, in fact, no 
equity whatsoever in the land not paid for and conveyed. It was 
more in the nature of a divisible option. Until the payment 
was made each year the seller had no obligation to convey. 
The interest paid was the consideration for the continuance 
of the option. Interest didn't start to accrue until March 1, 
1969. 
On page 18 of its brief appellant stated that it had ex-
pended large sums of money to develop the subdivision with 
installation of water, sewer, gas, power, drainage and other 
off-site improvements, sufficient to develop the balance of 
the ground. No place in appellant's brief does it refer to any 
place in the record where such evidence or testimony is shown 
or can be found. The only expenditures made by the appel-
lant were on the land actually paid for and conveyed. There 
was some storm drainage consisting of an open ditch installed 
(R. 237) and the 1.18 acres was purchased for that purpose 
(R. 166). The drainage was, in fact, not on the Taylor prop-
erty (R. 286, See Exhibit P-2). A preliminary subdivision 
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plot was prepared by Bush and Gudgell of the whole area (Ex-
hibit P-2), but there is no evidence in the record of any other 
expenditure by appellant on the unpaid for and undeeded land. 
Appellant claims that he spent money for engineering 
and re-zoning of the land and <lid, in fact, have not only the 
balance of the 50 acres re-zoned but an additional seven acres 
also extc:nding beyond the 50 acre line. In doing so, the appel-
lant in its application (Exhibit P-18) through John New its 
agent falsely swore that it was the owner of the property and 
then in connection with the hearing failed to give the Taylors 
any notice whatever or to list them ;is a property owner. (See 
last page of Exhibit P-18). It is interesting to note that New 
stated he planned to have the area built within five years. His 
oaths meant no more to him than his verbal or written prom-
ises. The property was, in fact, re-zoned on March 6, 1970. 
(See Exhibit P-31, R. 148-150). The re-zoning was without 
the knowledge or authority of Taylor. 
The respondent has not at any time misled appellant with 
respect to the payments that were to be made. Prior to March 
1, 1970 Taylor sent a notice of interest payment due on March 
l, 1970. This notice was dated February 10, 1970 (Exhibit 
P-6). However, the payment was not made on the due date 
and on March 14, 1970 New on behalf of Corporation Nine 
wrote Taylor requesting an extension until June 30, 1970 
and agreed to pay 10 percent interest on the interest due from 
March 1, 1970 until June 30, 1970 (Exhibit P-7). On June 
20, 1970, Taylor sent a notice of interest payment due June 
30, 1970 for the sum of $6,817 .02 (Exhibit P-8). On July 
29, 1970 New again wrote advising Taylor he would send the 
payment on August 5, 1970 (Exhibit P-9). In October of 
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1970 Taylor made a trip from his home in California to Salt 
lake to try to collect the interest payment due on March 1, 
1970 (R. 270). New promised that the payment would be 
made and Taylor gave him 24 or 48 hours to raise the money 
which was not done (R. 270). On November 24, 1970 Taylor 
wrote New a letter reviewing the matter with him and ad-
vised him that he was irrevocably defaulted (Exhibit R. 11). 
On November 19, 1970 New forwarded a letter and a 
check in the amount of $7,025.28 covering the interest due 
on March 1, 1970, with the accrued interest on interest. 
On February 25, 1971 Taylor sent notice to New advis-
ing him of the principal and interest due on March 1, 1971 
which was $25,000.00 for the principal payment and interest 
in the amount of $5,837.00 covering the period March 1, 
1970 to March 1, 1971. New failed to make payment, and 
notice of the termination in accordance with the provisions of 
the contract was given (Exhibit P-14) . The court found the 
notice to be proper in all respects and no claim has been made 
by appellant that it was defective. 
It is obvious from the evidence that the respondent gaw 
appellant ample opportunity to comply with the terms of the 
agreement by giving him notice of the various payments and by 
giving him extensions and that he was justified in terminating 
the agreement. The equities are all in favor of the respondent. 
Taylors were certainly not required to continue indefinitely 
making concessions to the appellant which continued to ignore 
the same and the trial court so found. 
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Appellant contends it made a proper tender of interest 
and principal payment in submiting its check for the sum 
of $9,197.00 which was dated March 24, 1971 (Exhibit P-15). 
The check was submitted as payment in full for the 1971 pay-
ment and annual interest. This was accompanied by a demand 
for conveyance of .752 of an acre of ground which appellant 
selected without discussion with respondent. 
Whereas, the previous conveyances had all been along the 
lot lines of the proposed subdivision, this request cut four lots 
into segments and would leave some partial lots on the west 
end of the property that would have limited, if any, use or 
value for home construction (Exhibit P-2). 
The tender was, therefore, not only improper with respect 
to the amount of the principal and interest payment due but 
also the appellant had no right under the terms of the con-
tract to select or have conveyed to him, if the tender of pay-
ment had been proper, the acreage as requested. 
The trial court's findings with respect to the default of 
the appellant and no default whatever upon the part of the re-
spondent is well supported by the evidence and should be 
affirmed by the appellate court. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT'S BREACH WAS SUBSTAN-
TIAL AND DID WARRANT A TERMINATION 
OF THE CONTRACT. 
There was no forfeiture involved in the termination of 
the contract. The appellant received all the land he paid for 
under the contract and, in fact, received the choicest part of 
the land to put on the Home Show ( R. 27 3). 
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There was no forfeiture of any land which had been paid 
for and no forfeiture of any money which had been paid by 
Corporation Nine to Taylor. The termination was for failure 
to pay for land which was scheduled to be taken and actually 
refused by the appellant by failure to make its payment. The 
interest to be paid was interest already accrued and owing to 
respondent as of March 1, 1971. Respondent had strictly 
performed his contractual obligations according to the letter 
and was prepared to deliver a deed to Corporation Nine upon 
payment of the principal payment of $25,000.00 and interest. 
Mr. Taylor still holds the title to the land that had not been 
conveyed to Corporation Nine (R. 250). He was at all times 
able to convey title to the appellant even though he had enter-
ed into a contract for sale of part of the property to Jerry 
Young. The contract with Corporation Nine had been re-
corded prior to the recording of the contract with Jerry Young. 
As a matter of fact, the court excluded this issue from the trial 
(R. 220). Respondent after payment of the interest by Cor-
poration Nine gave the appellant an additional opportunity 
to keep the contract in effect even though he had been sub-
stantially in default on his interest payment for March 1, 1970 
and gave him notice of the principal and interest payment due 
on March 1, 1971, but with full know ledge of the conse-
quences appellant elected to forego payment of the principal 
sum which was the very heart of the contract as far as Taylor 
was concerned. If Mr. New, the manager of Corporation Nine, 
was misled, it was by his own failure to use reasonable diligence 
to acquire knowledge of the facts and not by any misrepre-
sentation or trickery on Taylor's part. The contract provided 
that "time is the essence of the agreement" (Page 5, Exhibit 
P-1). 
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In the case of Woodard v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 220, 265 P.2d 
398 our court affirmed the well known doctrine that market-
ability of title need only be determined as of the time pur-
chaser tenders that which, under contract, would require vendor 
to transfer title which he agreed to convey. See also Walker 
v. Bintz and Shaw, 3 Utah 2d 162, 280 P.2d 767. The pur-
chaser is not entitled to specific performance until he himself 
has complied with his promises, the seller's duty to convey 
being contingent upon the buyer's performance of his obliga-
tion to make a proper tender of the purchase price. It would 
appear that Corporation Nine did not have the money to make 
a proper tender, based on the difficulty it had in paying the 
interest installment, and that it could not raise it. 
If it were shown that Taylor's contract with Young was 
valid and binding, Taylor might be subject to an action by 
Young for failure to convey to him, but, nevertheless, he did 
still have title to convey to appellant and even up to the final 
default of appellant stood ready to do so. 
The record does not support appellant's claim that there 
was insufficient breach of the contract to warrant a termination. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO TAKE 
EVIDENCE ON THE AMOUNT OF THE AT-
TORNEY'S FEE TO BE AWARDED. 
The court during the course of the trial and pursuant to 
stipulation of counsel agreed to hear evidence pertaining to 
the amount and reasonableness of the attorney's fee to be 
awarded to the prevailing party which was to be done after 
the court made its ruling ( R. 219). The court made an award 
19 
of $1,000.00 as an attorney's fee without taking evidence but 
acknowledged at the time of the argument of appellant's 
motion for an order to amend findings and conclusions of law 
or in the alternative for a new trial that it had overlooked this 
stipulation. Counsel for respondent feels confident that the 
trial court will hear evidence on the question of attorney's fees 
on remand of the case back to the District Court but to pro-
tect itself on the record raises that matter on appeal. The case 
of Provo City Corporation v. Cropper, 28 Utah 2d 1, 497 
P.2d 629, is authority for the principle that it is improper to 
make an award, in the absence of a stipulation as to the 
amount, without taking evidence as to the reasonableness of 
the fees. 
Respondent should be allowed to put on evidence of his 
attorney's fees. 
Respondent also requests that the Supreme Court award 
reasonable attorney's fees in connection with the handling of 
the appeal in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly ruled that the respondent Taylor 
was not in default in any way in connection with its perform-
ance under the contract, that appellant clearly was in default 
in failing to make the March 1, 1971 payment or proper 
tender thereof. The Supreme Court should award reasonable 
attorney's fees to the respondent in connection with the ser-
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vice pertaining to the appeal, affirm the trial court's judgment 
except as to the amount awarded as attorney's fees and re-
mand the case back to the trial court for hearing of evidence as 
to the amount and reasonableness of the attorney's fee to be 
awarded. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. L. SUMMERHAYS of 
STRONG & HANNI 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents 
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